Friday, September 15, 2017

DNA - 15/09/2017 حزب الله: الحرية لأسرانا فقط

فوق السلطة- لمّا أتكلم أنت تسكت

الكاتبة مضاوي الرشيد ترد على سعود القحطاني: نترقب نهاية النظام السعودي

Madawii1
Link

لندن ـ “القدس العربي”: قالت الكاتبة والأكاديمية السعودية مضاوي الرشيد انها تترقب نهاية النظام السعودي.
وردت الرشيد وهي ناشطة ومعارضة سعودية تقيم في بريطانيا على المستشار في الديوان الملكي السعودي سعود القحطاني الذي غرد على “تويتر” منتقدا سحب الجنسيات، معتبرا هذه الخطوة تأذن بزوال ملك الظالم، قائلة إن النظام السعودي سحب جنسيتها وهو ما يوحي بقرب نهايته.
وكان القحطاني قال في تغريدته “الجنسية حق للمواطن وحين تُسحب بلا نظام وتصادر الأملاك وينضام الرجال الذين لم يعرف أجدادهم الضيم فترقب نهاية الظالم المؤلمة”.
وردت الرشيد على القحطاني بقولها “بالفعل اترقب نهاية النظام السعودي لانه سحب جنسيتي بدون نظام”.
madawi1
وكانت الرشيد علقت مؤخرا على حملة الاعتقالات الأخيرة في السعودية، وقالت إنهم اعتقلوا “لأنهم يفكرون”. وأضافت: “لا يتسع تويتر لكل الهاشتاقات، سلطة مهتزة متغطرسة”.
وتابعت الرشيد بأن “الرجل الوحيد في السلطة يخاف من ظله، لذلك هو يعتقل يمينا ويسارا”.
وبحسب مضاوي الرشيد، فإن “حملة الاعتقالات هي رد على فشل النظام في معركته مع قطر، لم تركع قطر والآن يريد أن يركع الشعب”.
 يشار إلى أن مضاوي هي بنت طلال بن محمد الرشيد، وحفيدة آخر حاكم من أسرة الرشيد الحاكمة في حائل (1830 – 1921) .
والرشيد أستاذة علم الإنثربولوجيا الديني، في قسم اللاهوت والدراسات الدينية بكلية الملوك بجامعة لندن، تعمل على النقاشات الدينية السياسية في المملكة العربية السعودية خاصة بعد أحداث 11سبتمبر2001. حيث قامت بتأليف العديد من الكتب والمقالات في المجلات الأكاديمية عن شبه الجزيرة العربية والهجرة العربية و العولمة.

Thursday, September 14, 2017

Leaked UAE emails: Saudi Arabia came close to 'conquering' Qatar

Leaked message purportedly sent from Emirati ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, says a takeover would 'solve everyone's problems'

Link

Saudi Arabia came close to “conquering” Qatar, according to a recent email purportedly sent by the Emirati ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba.
The claim came in a new batch of leaked emails, released online overnight on Wednesday, by an unknown party.
In a May 2017 email thread with former US diplomat Elliot Abrams, Otaiba writes that conquering Qatar would “solve everyone’s problems. Literally. And King Abdullah of Saudi came pretty close to doing something in Qatar a few months before he passed” in January 2015.
Abrams, clearly surprised, replies: “I didn’t know that. Dramatic!”
“How hard could it be?” he asks, pointing out that the local Qatari population numbers around 250,000 to 300,000 people.
“Foreigners won’t interfere,” he adds. “Promise the Indians a raise, promise the police a raise and who is going to fight to the death?,” he writes, presumably referring to Qatar’s high migrant population of south Asian workers.
Otaiba replies: “That was the conclusion. It would be an easy lift.”
“Obama would have hated it,” Abrams replied, “but the new guy…” he added, appearing to imply that current US President Donald Trump would support such a military takeover of Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbour.
“Exactly,” Otaiba replies.
Otaiba was originally responding to a suggestion from Abrams that Jordan should conquer Qatar.
“The Hashemites need to conquer Qatar,” Abrams wrote as “that solves their cash problem and the problem of Qatari support for extremism.”
Abrams was a deputy assistant to US President George W. Bush, and deputy national security advisor in his administration. He is currently senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 
A month after this email exchange took place, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt announced an economic and political blockade of Qatar, accusing it of supporting “terrorism", a charge Doha denies.
A spokesperson at the UAE embassy in the US told MEE that she was “not in a position to confirm or deny” the emails were genuine.
A representative for Abrams has not, at time of writing, responded to MEE’s request for comment.

THE NEW GULAG CALLED SAUDI ARABIA


THE NEW SAUDI ARABIA.......

UNDER THE NEW KING MBS!

TO ALL THE SHEEPLE: OBEY.......
OR ELSE!

YOU DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT!
ALL TOGETHER NOW TO MBS:
BAA, BAA, BAA,..........

ما وراء الخبر-توسّع حملة الاعتقالات الأخيرة في السعودية

DNA - 14/09/2017 حزب الله يبرِّر لإسرائيل

A GREAT CARTOON BY EMAD HAJJAJ: NORMALIZATION UNDER THE TABLE!

تطبيع سري

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

الحصاد- السعودية.. حملة الاعتقالات تتسع

ما وراء الخبر- لماذا ترفض السعودية التحقيق بانتهاكات اليمن؟

Saudi Arabia urges subjects to inform on each other for Twitter 'crimes'

Saudi interior ministry calls on subjects to report 'information crimes' on social media, using app originally created to report burglaries

Link

Saudi Arabia is urging its people to snoop on and report subversive social media activity as part of an apparent crackdown on potential government critics before demonstrations called by exiled opposition figures.
A message sent on a Twitter account run by the interior ministry late on Tuesday called on citizens and residents to monitor each other for what it called "information crimes".
"When you notice any account on social networks publishing terrorist or extremist ideas, please report it immediately via the application #We're_all_security", it said, referring to a mobile phone app launched last year to enable civilians to report traffic violations and burglaries.
Hours later, the public prosecutor tweeted a section of the kingdom's terrorism law which states: "Endangering national unity, obstructing the Basic Law of governance or some of its articles, and harming the state's reputation or status are terrorist crimes."
Exiled Saudi critics have called for demonstrations on Friday to galvanise opposition to the royal family and at least a dozen prominent clerics, intellectuals and activists, including prominent Islamist cleric Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, have been detained this week, activists say.
Protests are banned in Saudi Arabia as are political parties. Unions are illegal, the press is controlled and criticism of the royal family can lead to prison.
Riyadh says it does not have political prisoners, while top officials have said monitoring activists is needed to maintain social stability.
The detentions reported by activists follow widespread speculation, denied by officials, that King Salman intends to abdicate to his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who dominates economic, diplomatic and domestic policy.
It also coincides with growing tensions with Qatar over its alleged support of Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood which is listed by Riyadh as a terrorist organisation.
Some Twitter users expressed support for the government's approach, using the "We're all Security" hashtag.
"No flattery, no silence whether for a relative or friend in securing the homeland," said one. "Defend your security. Chaos starts with calls for freedom and reform. Do not believe them."

Ideological threat

The government has not clearly acknowledged this week's arrests or responded to requests for comment.
But state news agency SPA said on Tuesday authorities had uncovered "intelligence activities for the benefit of foreign parties" by a group of people it did not identify.
A Saudi security source told Reuters the suspects were accused of "espionage activities and having contacts with external entities including the Muslim Brotherhood", which Riyadh has classified as a terrorist organisation.
The government toughened its stance on dissent following the Arab Spring in 2011 after it averted unrest by offering billions of dollars in handouts and state spending.
But the Brotherhood, which represents an ideological threat to Riyadh's dynastic system of rule, has gained power elsewhere in the region.
Since the kingdom's founding, the ruling Saud family has enjoyed a close alliance with clerics of the ultra-conservative Wahhabi school of Islam. In return, the clerics have espoused a political philosophy that demands obedience to the ruler.
By contrast the Muslim Brotherhood advances an active political doctrine urging revolutionary action, which flies in the face of Wahhabi teaching.
The Brotherhood-inspired Sahwa movement in the 1990s agitated to bring democracy to Saudi Arabia and criticised the ruling family for corruption, social liberalisation and working with the West, including allowing US troops into the kingdom during the 1991 Iraq war.
The Sahwa were largely undermined by a mixture of repression and co-option but remain active.
The Saud family has always regarded Islamist groups as the biggest internal threat to its rule over a country in which appeals to religious sentiment cannot be lightly dismissed and an al-Qaeda campaign a decade ago killed hundreds.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic and transport links with Qatar in June over its alleged support for Islamist militants, a charge that Doha denies. 

Back to the future: Saudis on the Sahwi warpath

By launching a fresh wave of Islamist detentions, 1990s-style, the Saudi regime is intimidating the kingdom's most famous and well-known religious figures. The future king finds himself increasingly isolated

Madawi Al-Rasheed

Link

Saudi Arabia is determined to return to the 1990s and the prolonged detention of Islamists, especially those known as Sahwis, an amalgamation of Salafi-Ikhwani (Brotherhood) affiliates. In the past week, around 20 have been arrested, the most famous among them are Sheikh Salman al-Odah, Awadh al-Qarni, and Ali al-Omari.
Saudi Arabia is determined to return to the 1990s and the prolonged detention of Islamists
Having followed the political careers of those clerics and written a book about some of them, the arrest came as a surprise. Most of those Sahwis have been tamed by their previous experiences in prison, a natural evolution of their Islamic thinking and new circumstances.
But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly not convinced. On 10 September, according to a source who cannot be identified, he sent three men to arrest Salman al-Odah without any concern over his followers’ reaction. 
In the early 1990s, the last time al-Odah was arrested in his hometown Buraiydah in the centre of Saudi Arabia, his followers and students staged the first demonstration against the detention of an Islamist in Saudi Arabia. The demonstration was recorded on video and kept for future generation of Islamists to learn from. 
Salman al-Odah (Emad Alhusayni/Flickr)
At the time, this was dubbed "intifadat Buraiydah", the Buraiydah uprising. Al-Odah spent at least five years in prison for delivering sermons that criticised the government for inviting foreign troops to defend Saudi Arabia during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
So why has al-Odah been arrested again and for what purpose?

Motivation mystery

Here we are in the realm of speculation. According to one narrative, the Saudi government wanted him to denounce Qatar and overtly defend the Saudi position. His last tweets in which he supplicated to God to bring unity among Muslim leaders immediately after the doomed phone call between Mohammed bin Salman and Sheikh Tamim of Qatar weren't taken very well in official Saudi circles.
ربنا لك الحمد لا نحصي ثناءً عليك أنت كما أثنيت على نفسك..اللهم ألف بين قلوبهم لمافيه خير شعوبهم
Translation: “May God harmonise their hearts for the good of their people” 
Four days later, the sheikh is still in detention. No family member has been able to see him or find out more details about his whereabouts after three security officials picked him up and drove away. 
By launching a fresh wave of Islamist detentions, the Saudi regime is intimidating the most famous and well-known religious figures in the country, sending a message to their followers, who have been surprisingly very quiet and dormant since the Arab uprisings of 2011.
Islamists made noises when the Saudi regime supported the Egyptian coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood and many signed a petition denouncing those who lent support to the military dictatorship.
Yet Salman al-Odah was careful not to enrage the regime. He celebrated the Arab revolutions and explained that they are overdue. When people lose hope, they go to the streets demanding their rights, he said. Freedom, justice and dignity are universal in his opinion.
While he escaped arrest at the time, he was definitely watched lest he express any opinion that would serve to mobilise Saudi youth eager to copy their Egyptian counterparts.

Silence not enough

However, the critical moment came with the Saudi-Qatar crisis. Since June 2017, the regime has been watching and monitoring the reaction of Islamists, all accused of being loyal to Qatar, if not on its payroll.
The regime became increasingly suspicious of Islamists, accusing them of double loyalty, and acting as a fifth Qatari column in the heart of Saudi Arabia
Al-Odah and the others remained silent, preferring not to take sides openly. But that was not enough. The Saudi regime wanted to test their loyalty and extract total submission from them. As they refrained from openly supporting the regime, the regime became increasingly suspicious, accusing them of double loyalty, and acting as a fifth Qatari column in the heart of Saudi Arabia. 
This reminds us of the official Saudi narrative about the Shia of the Eastern Province. Every time they rise to demand their rights, they are accused of being an Iranian fifth column. So now the Islamists are treated with suspicion because they are believed to follow Qatar.
Dissent in Saudi Arabia is always treated as the conspiracy of other governments. The regime does not recognise that there might be legitimate and overdue demands that are denied. But Saudi Arabia had opposition movements long before the creation of the state of Qatar.

Home alone

The Saudi regime must be feeling the pressure of the failure of its recent aggressive regional policy and domestic leadership shuffles. The man at the top, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, seems to be home alone. He got rid of other competing princes, old uncles, and more experienced contemporaries. He fears his own kin and, if he stumbles, he may not find a saviour.  
He has antagonised the large Islamist movement and sidelined Salafis loyal to the regime. He marginalised them, deprived them of any real power, and undermined their authority when he promised to entertain Saudis with new singing and dancing venues that threaten their control. 
Mohammed bin Salman rules with an iron fist now as other softer means have stopped being deployed. He does not care about his own family's consensus or society’s approval. His multiple initiatives to revive the economy and transform Saudi Arabia may backfire and fall back on their launching pads.
The arrested Islamists are just the latest casualty in a struggle that is proving difficult to win for the young and inexperienced prince.
READ MORE►
Previous beleaguered kings have fallen on two legitimacy narratives: one, celebrating the regime’s commitment to Islam, or the second, highlighting its commitment to development and prosperity. Mohammed bin Salman can no longer count on either to cement his rule and enlist others in his defence.
He has alienated Islamists and arrested their most prolific and famous cleric while his economic transformation plans seem too overambitious to become reality anytime soon. Saudi Arabia is heading towards an unpredictable turn that may become seriously problematic.
Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed is a visiting professor at the Middle East Centre at LSE. She has written extensively about the Arabian Peninsula, Arab migration, globalisation, religious transnationalism and gender. On Twitter: @MadawiDr

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Emad Hajjaj's Cartoon: Human Rights in the Arab World

حقوق الانسان العربي

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

Heads, Saudi loses. Tails, Iran wins

By David Hearst


Link

However many twists and turns the crisis of Sunni leadership takes, one regional power always seems to come out on top. That country is Iran.
Iran’s threat to intervene militarily was one of the factors that thwarted Saudi Arabia’s plans to invade Qatar at the very start of the blockade. I understand from informed sources that Iran proved to be a more important deterrent when Riyadh was contemplating sending tanks over the border than the token presence of Turkish troops in Doha.
The result? After what was declared to be “a good Hajj” for the 86,000 Iranian pilgrims that took part, a Saudi delegation will travel to Tehran to “visit the buildings” of the Saudi Embassy abandoned two years ago when the countries broke off relations.
Furthermore, after a series of visits, Saudi is rebuilding its relations with Baghdad and Iraqi interior minister Qasim al-Araji has offered his services as a mediator. Al-Araji is a senior member of Badr organisation who is close to Qassim Suleimani, the commander of the Quds force of the IRGC who become the Napoleon of Iranian military intervention in Syria and Iraq. 
It takes an instrument akin to a seismometer to monitor the sudden shifts and lurches in Saudi foreign policy. 
On one end, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has threatened to wage war inside Iran. He said in May that Tehran’s ultimate aim was to wrest control of the holy sites.
It takes an instrument akin to a seismometer to monitor the sudden shifts and lurches in Saudi foreign policy
“We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia,” he said, without elaborating on policies. “Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.”
On the other end, he tells two retired US diplomats in Washington that he wants out of Yemen and is relaxed about US dialogue with Iran.
The enemy of the Saudi kingdom is constantly changing shape and form. Under King Abdullah, it was the Arab Spring and political Islam. Under King Salman, the enemy was first Iran and then Qatar. At the time of writing, there is no more urgent task for the Saudis than to suborn and control its unruly neighbour. By the time of publication, this may have changed once again.
Of course, there are reasons for these shifts. To be a Saudi military planner is to endure a series of military and strategic defeats. Saudi and Qatari-backed rebels have lost in Syria and they have been abandoned by Riyadh. The two-year campaign against the Houthis has become a military disaster. The siege of Qatar is another losing bet.
READ MORE ►
Supporters of the 32-year-old Saudi crown prince and defence minister have described him as a pragmatist. Another way of describing each U-turn that he makes is the realisation that he should not have pulled the trigger in the first place. An activist foreign policy only works if the action achieves its intended goals. Otherwise it is goes by other names.
Nonetheless, it takes some experience to profit from these mistakes, and Iran has this in abundance. It is not so much profiting from these mistakes of its neighbours as much as running rings around them.
How did Iran achieve the position of being the default winner of the fierce contests being fought by its Sunni Arab neighbours?

Importance of 9/11

Iran did not emerge from the last century in a good state. It had fought a brutal border war with Saddam Hussein that lasted for eight years and cost over a million Iranian lives. It has endured 20 years of US sanctions. It was regarded as a pariah state, to be declared by George W. Bush as a part of the "axis of evil" in 2002. In fact September 11, 2001 transformed Iran’s strategic position. All of a sudden the West had a more virulent global threat to deal with in al-Qaeda. America co-operated with Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan, opening the door slightly ajar. From here on in, Iran’s foreign policy went on the offensive.
Iran used its period of international isolation wisely. Whatever the balance of power internally, Iran developed a unified central command, a clear strategy, and the confidence to rely on its own resources. It created its own military industrial complex, which could manufacture sophisticated weapons like missiles. It had its own oil economy to sustain it.
Newly-upgraded Sayyad-3 air defense missiles on display during an inauguration of its production line at an undisclosed location in Iran (AFP)
The biggest lesson it had learned by September 11 is that if you want to achieve something as a nation, you have to be able to defend yourself. With this determination came a clear strategy to become the dominant military and political power in the region. Iran was determined to ensure strategic depth in Iraq and Syria. This it is now achieved.
Iran used three tactics to pursue its goals. The first was to strengthen links with all Arab groups in the region that regarded Iran as a protective power. This did not just mean extending military help to Shia minorities in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The aid was political and organisational. Iran provided infrastructure that the decaying Arab state could not - hospitals, schools and local services.
The second tactic was to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of occupying American or British forces, particularly in southern Iraq.  
The third tactic was to be pragmatic enough to make deals with its enemies if the occasion warranted. 
Exhibit A is Iran’s covert relationship with al-Qaeda whose leaders it has sheltered, and through whose territory they could transit. The 9/11 commission report talked of “ strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al-Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11 and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers”. Last year, the US Treasury Department announced it had sanctioned three high level al-Qaeda operatives living in Iran.
Bin Laden returned the favour. In October 2007 he wrote a letter to the Islamic State of Iraq, the precursor to the Islamic State (IS) group, in which he disapproved of the threats it was making to Iran.
Iran developed a unified central command, a clear strategy, and the confidence to rely on its own resources
“You did not consult with us on that serious issue that affects the general welfare of all of us. We expected you would consult with us for these important matters, for as you are aware, Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication, as well as the matter of hostages.” Bin Laden wrote.
Exhibit B is Iran’s covert military support for the Taliban. Four senior Iranian commandos were among scores of Taliban dead, when a three-week siege of Farah in Afghanistan was lifted by US air strikes. As the US winds down its 16-year war, it is not just Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who expressed interest in who stays behind. As Carlotta Gall of the New York Times reportedlast month, the Taliban has become a useful proxy for Iranian interests, raising the costs of the continuing US intervention. It’s a tale that is deeply familiar to Arab eyes.
Lately, Hamas has been repairing relations that were shattered by the Syrian civil war, with Iran, and senior Iranian diplomats have indicated their readiness to reach out to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Changing course on Iran

Now compare this to how Saudi Arabia behaves: It does not build alliances; it abandons the proxy militias it attempts to micromanage; pursues different agendas in different countries. It does not have a unified strategic vision, and Saudi power is based on a family, not a state. Above all, Saudi cannot defend its own borders with its own army.
What then is the motivation for MbS to seek to repair relations with Iran?
There are four possible motives. Immediately after bin Salman warned Iran about bringing the war to it, rocket propelled grenades began appearing and being used against police targets in the restive Eastern and Shia-dominated Saudi province. It was a message that bin Salman appeared to heed. 
The second is that the purpose of all his actions is to become king. He knows there are many challenges for him and he needs to minimise them. He needs an exit strategy for Yemen and for that, a relationship with Iran is essential. 
The third is that his relationship with Trump has so far failed to pay off. America has not given him the support he expected on Qatar and has failed to move on Iran. MbS may be waiting a long time. Trump is too busy with North Korea ,and America is too divided a country to launch a fresh Middle Eastern war.
The fourth reason is the most intriguing one. It is that Qatar has become a bigger threat to MbS than Iran. Qatar has more sympathy in Saudi, especially among the losing members of the royal household and the Crown Prince feels this. He needs to strengthen his ties with Iran in the fight against his Gulf neighbour. 

Winning the battle

Iran is winning the battle but it has so far failed to win the war. Its intervention in the Arab world has created much division that will be hard to heal. Millions of Sunnis are refugees in their own country and if a top Syrian commander has his way, will remain so.
Major General Issam Zahreddine, of the elite presidential Republican Guard, "advised" anyone who fled the ongoing conflict in Syria not to return, adding that the army would not "forget or forgive”.
"To those who fled Syria to another country, I beg you don’t ever return, because even if the government forgives you, we will never forgive or forget," he said on Syrian state television. He later apologised for his remarks and said that they were misinterpreted. He claimed he had been speaking about IS, not Syrian civilian refugees. But that was not how his original sectarian remarks were received by the refugees themselves.
Sectarian conflict is easy to start but much harder to stop. History will not stop at this point, and if Iran is to be part of the regional peace it has to think about how it will heal the sectarian divisions, which its interventions have sustained. Arab stability is in Iran’s long-term interest.
David Hearst is editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He was chief foreign leader writer of The Guardian, former Associate Foreign Editor, European Editor, Moscow Bureau Chief, European Correspondent, and Ireland Correspondent. He joined The Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.

DNA - 12/09/2017 محور المقاومة..وانتصار البطاطا

السعودية: اعتقالات وإقالات واحتجاز أمراء على وقع دعوات التظاهر

عرب ٤٨

AN IMPORTANT ARTICLE!

THE HOUSE OF SAUD HAS HAD A PERFECT RECORD....
IN FAILURE.....

IN LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAQ, YEMEN......

COULD SAUDI ARABIA ITSELF BE NEXT??

Link
السعودية: اعتقالات وإقالات واحتجاز أمراء على وقع دعوات التظاهر


تبدو السّعودية وكأنها فوق صفيح ساخن؛ فاعتقالات رجال دين بارزين دفعةً واحدة، وتحريض على آخرين، واحتجاز أمراء "صغار" في الأسرة الحاكمة، والخوف من "الأمراء الكبار"، أكثر، منع صحافيين من الكتابة، وزيارة لبن سلمان إلى إسرائيل، وفشل الحكومة في توفير احتياطي القمح المطلوب أبرز ما ميّز الأخبار الواردة من السعوديّة بعد عيد الأضحى المبارك وانتهاء "موسم" الحجّ، على وقع دعوات لاحتجاجات عارمة الجمعة المقبل، بدعوة من "حراك 15 سبتمبر"... وآخر ما ورد: اكتشاف "خليّة إرهابيّة" من سعوديين وأجانب.
تتشابه الأخبار الواردة من السّعوديّة مع الأخبار الواردة من مصر أثناء الدعوات لتظاهرات "جمعة الأرض" أو "جمعة الغلابة"، كأن السعودية تتعامل مع وصفة مصريّة للتخلّص من الحراك الذي لم يغادر مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، بعدُ، من كتائب إلكترونيّة تشن هجمات "رخيصة" في مواقع التواصل الاجتماعيّ، موّحدة الصّور والتعبيرات، وتستهدف أشخاصًا بعينهم، إلى إعلان مفترض عن القبض عن "خلايا إرهابية" تتجسس لصالح "دولة معادية".
اعتقال وجوه الصّحوة
لكن أكثر ما شغل الرّأي العام السّعودي هو اعتقال وجوه تيّار "الصّحوة" الديني، وأبرزهم سلمان العودة، عوض القرنيّ وعلي العمريّ، ليلة السبت-الأحد، مع تحريض كتائب مقرّبة من النظام السّعودي على اعتقال دعاة بارزين آخرين، مثل محمّد العريفي.
كانت نشأة تيار "الصّحوة" في ثمانينيّات القرن الماضي، واشتدّ عوده في التسعينيات مطالبًا بإصلاح سياسيّ في المملكة التي تتبنى نظاما متشددًا يقوم على السمع والطاعة والولاء السياسيّ لأبناء الملك عبد العزيز والدّيني لأبناء الشيخ محمّد بن عبد الوّهاب، وهو تزاوج سياسي يقوم على المصاهرة والجهويّة والخطاب السياسي؛ وزُجَّ بأبرز قادة تيار الصحوة في السجون أبرزهم سلمان العودة، الذي بقي في السجن قرابة 5 سنوات، ثم أفرج عنه بعد "المناصحة" التي قام بها دعاة مقرّبون من السلطات السّعوديّة في السّجون.
يكتسب الخطاب الديني السعودي أهميّة قصوى، إذ منعت السلطات السّعودية أي خطاب ديني يبتعد عن الخطاب الديني المحدّد والمضبوط جدًا في تزاوج ديني وسياسي بين آل سعود وآل الشيخ، منذ بداية الدولة السعودية الثالثة بدايات القرن الماضي.
حركة "الصّحوة" ليست الخطاب الديني الوحيد الذي واجه حكم آل سعود، إذ انقلب رجال الدين الذين سخّرهم الملك عبد العزيز (وكان لقبه حينها "السلطان") من أجل التجنيد الديني للسيطرة على الحجاز والأماكن المقدّسة وإسقاط المملكة الحجازيّة (1925)، عليه، إذ قادوا ما عُرف تاريخيًا بـ"ثورة الإخوان" التي استمرت عامين وشنّت غزوات على العراق والكويت أولًا (1929-1930)، ولاحقًا قادت حربًا طويلة ضد الدولة السعودية الوليدة، التي لاقت معارضة حتى ممّن ساهموا في نشوئها، وكادت تكلّف آل سعود عرشهم ودولتهم.
أدركت السلطات السّعودية، حينها، أهميّة التخليّ عن الخطاب الديني الرّسمي، وأسست، بعد التخلص من حرب الإخوان، ما يعرف حاليًا باسم "المملكة العربيّة السّعوديّة"، متخليّة عن اسم "سلطنة نجد والحجاز وتوابعها"، في محاولة للتغلب على الجهوية والقبلية.
لاحقًا، عادت السّعودية إلى الخطاب الديني، لكن خارجيًا، مع إعلان الجهاد ضد الاتحاد السوفياتي في أفغانستان وشن حملات دينيّة لتجنيد الدّعاة رأسها، للمفارقة، الملك سلمان بن عبد العزيز، وهو ما تطوّر، بعد ذلك، إلى جماعة "القاعدة" التي انقلبت على النظام السّعودي نفسه.
إذًا، تولي السعودية أهميّة خاصّة للدعوة الدينية وترفض أن تخرج من سيطرتها أو من خارج "الزّواج المقدّس" بين آل الشيخ وآل سعود.
احتجاز أمراء من الأسرة الحاكمة
تأكّدت خلال الأسبوع الماضي، وفق مغرّدين سعوديين، أنباء اعتقال أعضاء في الأسرة الحاكمة، منهم الأمير عبد العزيز بن فهد، مع أنباء أن وليّ العهد المعزول، محمد بن نايف، لا زال تحت الإقامة الجبرية في قصره منذ عزله في تمّوز/يوليو الماضي.
عمد الملك عبد العزيز إلى التزوّج من عدد كبير من النساء من أجل بناء علاقات مصاهرة مع كافة قبائل شبه الجزيرة العربيّة وصل حتى 37 زوجة أنجب منهم قرابة 70 ولدًا، وخلال ثمانين عامًا هي السّعودية، شهدت الأسرة المالكة خلافات حامية الوطيس بين أفرادها، من تنافس محموم على العرش بين الملكين سعود وفيصل، وما يعني ذلك من تنافس بين قبائل أخوال الملكين، انتهت بخلع الأول من منصبه، وتحييد أبنائه عن المناصب ردحًا من الزّمان، وثمّ اغتيال الثاني من قبل عضو في الأسرة الحاكمة.
انشغلت "المؤسسة" الملكيّة في السّعودية في ضبط توازن الأجنحة داخل الأسرة المالكة، إلا أن جناح السديريّين منذ وصول الملك فهد إلى الحكم ظل الأقوى لتماسكه دون الأجنحة الأخرى، وهنا تكمن خطورة الخلاف بين محمد بن سلمان ومحمّد بن نايف، إذ أن كليهما ينتميان إلى الجناح نفسه، جناح السديريّين، ما يُنبئ بانقسامه، لأوّل مرّة، خصوصًا مع اعتقاله، مؤخرًا، الأمير عبد العزيز بن فهد، وهو أيضًا من جناح السديريّين.
كل هذه الخطوات، التي ساهمت في تفرقة أجنحة الأسرة المالكة السّعوديّة، ساهمت، كذلك، في تأخير وصول محمّد بن سلمان إلى سدّة الملك في السّعوديّة، بعد وصوله إلى منصب ولي ولي العهد، أولًا، مستغلا حرب اليمن، التي لا زالت تراوح مكانها وقتلت آلاف المدنيّين، ومنصب وليّ العهد، ثانيًا، مستغلا الحصار على قطر.
حراك 15 سبتمبر
أثناء غمرة هذه الأحداث (الاعتقالات)، وسعي محمّد بن سلمان للوصول إلى العرش، ظهرت دعوات على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، وتحديدًا "تويتر" (الأوسع انتشارًا في السّعوديّة)، لتظاهرات في الخامس عشر من أيلول/سبتمبر الجاري، ونشرت مطالب واضحة ووجّهت رسائل إلى جنود القوّات المسلّحة.
ولا يعرف من يقود دعوات الحراك، حتى الآن، إلا أنه لقي دعمًا من معارضين شهيرين مقيمين في المنفى، مثل مضاوي الرّشيد، سعد الفقيه والمغرّد الشهير "مجتهد"، وآخرين.
وجاء في رسالة الحراك إلى جنود القوات المسّلحة "إخواننا في الجيش، شاهدنا بين الحين والآخر بعضكم يظهر في اليوتيوب يستجدي أصحاب القرار لسداد ديونٍ أو يستنجد لأنهم يطردون أهله من بيتهم. هذا الوضع لا يمكن احتماله، ولا نرضاه لكم، الشعب قرّر أن يتحرّك من أجلكم ومن أجل العاطلين والفقراء ومن أجل المعتقلين والمظلومين ومن أجل المحرومين من السّكن ومن أجل إزالة كل ظلم ومحاربة كل فساد"، وفقًا لحساب الحراك في "تويتر".
وقد لاقت دعوات التظاهر صداها، لا في الشارع حيث لم يأتِ بعد موعد استحقاقها لسبر غور قدرة النّاس على التغيير الحقيقي، إنما في المؤسسة الحاكمة التي شنّت حملات اعتقال واسعة جدًا، ضمّت بالإضافة إلى الواردين أعلاه (تيار "الصّحوة" والأمراء) إنما شعراء، مثل الشاعر زياد بن نحيت، لامتداحه فنانًا قطريًا، وإيقاف الكاتب جمال خاشقجي عن الكتابة في صحيفة "الحياة"، الذي أنجده وجوده في الولايات المتّحدة من الاعتقال، وفق مراقبين.
ومع استشعار السلطات السعوديّة الخطر من الحراك المقبل، خصوصا مع ازدياد الأوضاع الاقتصاديّة سوءًا، وبالتالي ازدياد التململ الشعبيّ، لأسباب عديدة: تراجع أسعار النفط، الصفقات الضخمة مع الولايات المتّحدة الأميركيّة واستقبال الرّئيس الأميركي، دونالد ترامب، الفخم والمكّلف جدًا في العاصمة، الرّياض، خصخصة المطاحن ونيّة الحكومة رفع الدّعم عن الطحين (وفق صحيفة "الرّياض" الرّسمية، اليوم، الثلاثاء)، التكلفة الباهظة لحرب اليمن ونشر جنود فيديوهاتٍ لهم وهم يستجدون السلطات لإعالة أسرهم، شراء محمد بن سلمان يختا بلغت تكلفته 550 مليون دولار، قضاء الملك سلمان رحلة فخمة في المغرّب كلّفت أكثر من 100 مليون دولار، وإزالة قرية مقنعة قرب مكّة، التي يسكنها الفقراء والمعدمون، عن الوجود، العام الماضي.
كما شهدت المنطقة الشّرقية، الغنية بالنفط الفقراء سكانها، تظاهرات عارمة مستمرّة منذ أعوام، إذ لم تنجح السّعودية منذ الثورة ضد "أرامكو"، أو ما عرفت بـ"انتفاضة عمال الظهران" عام 1952، بإشعار المواطنين شرقيّ المملكة بأنهم مواطنون في دولة كل مواطنيها، إنما ظلّت تميّز ضدّهم لأسباب دينية أولًا، وقبلية ثانيًا.
أمّا المناطق الجنوبيّة، فهي رغم عامين ونصف العام من الحرب المستمرة على اليمن، إلا أنّها لا زالت تعاني من هجمات متكرّرة من الحوثيين وحليفهم اللدود، الرّئيس المخلوع، علي صالح، الذي تستقبل الإمارات أنجاله، ومنعت السعوديّة الإطاحة به.
كما فشلت السّلطات السعوديّة في خلق حالة تجييش شعبي ضد قطر بعد إعلان الحصار عليها، مثلما نجح الحال حين أعلنت عاصفة الحزم بداية عام 2015، على العكس، بل إن ذلك أثار حنقا، ولو مكتوما بين السّعوديّين، نجحت السلطات في إخفائه بعد سنّها قوانينَ تجرّم التضامن مع قطر، مثلما حصل مع الصّحافي السّعودي العامل في قناة "الجزيرة"، عليّ الظفيريّ.
الوصفة المصريّة: الإرهاب أولًا؛ إسرائيل دائمًا
لم يتكون التململ الشعبي السعودي من الأحداث الأخيرة فقط، إنما هو نتيجة تراكمات سياسيّة واجتماعيّة ودينيّة واقتصاديّة، كشفت عنها الأحداث الأخيرة، التي يبدو أنها أثارت قلقًا مصريًا.
يخال المطّلع على الشأن المصري أن الوصفة المصريّة للتخلص من الحراكات المناهضة تركز إلى محورين: "حذّر من عمليات إرهابيّة محتملة بكل وسائلك... والأهم: إقامة علاقات ثابتة مع إسرائيل"... وهذا ما حدث.
إذ أصدرت السلطات السعوديّة بيانا، ليل الإثنين الثلاثاء، قالت فيه إنها أحبطت هجوما إرهابيًا وألقت القبض على مجموعات تتجسس لصالح جهات أجنبيّة (لم تسمّها).
أما العلاقات مع إسرائيل فتأخذ نسقا متسارعا جدا، إذ إن إسرائيل شريكة مع السعوديّة في إدارة منطقة مضيق تيران وصنافير التي انتقلت سيادتها للسعوديّة، مع ما ذكرته صحيفة "جيروزاليم بوست" الإسرائيليّة، آب/أغسطس الماضي، أن إسرائيل تراقب الشواطئ اليمنيّة من أجل منع تهريب سلاح للحوثيين بالتنسيق مع السعوديين وملّفات كثيرة أخرى، لم تخفها الصّحف السعوديّة الرسمية، مثل موقع "إيلاف"، الذي نقل أن الملك سلمان تواصل مع الإسرائيليين حول المسجد الأقصى المبارك أيام إضراب المقدسيين في تموز/يوليو الماضي.
قد تكون الوصفة المصريّة سريعة التحضير، وشبه مضمونة، لكن عواقبها، بالتأكيد، وخيمة.
ما الذي سيحدث في 15 سبتمبر؟
لا أحد يعرف؛ ربما يخرج الناس إلى الشارع وربّما لا، لكن السيناريو الأكثر ترجيحًا هو السيناريو الذي حدث عام 2011، حين دعا السعوديّون، متأثرين برياح الرّبيع العربيّ العاتية، إلى التظاهر، وفي اليوم ذاته، الذي حدد للتظاهرن عاد الملك السابق، عبد الله بن عبد العزيز من الخارج وألقى فيه خطابا قدّم فيه الكثير من الامتيازات المالية والاقتصادية للمواطنين ونجح في أخماد الاحتجاجات في الرّياض ونجد ولو إلى حين.

Emad Hajjaj's Cartoon: الموك والمعارضة السورية

الموك والمعارضة السورية

Monday, September 11, 2017

الحصاد- اعتقالات السعودية.. الدوافع والرسائل

Azmi Bishara's latest comment

من حرية التعبير إلى حرية الصمت

عادة يطالب الأحرار في دول الاستبداد بحرية التعبير. في بلداننا سجل الاستبداد "مأثرة" إجبار المثقفين والصحفيين وغيرهم على قول ما تريد أن تسمع. وبهذا نقلهم إلى تمني "حرية الصمت" والمطالبة بها


في الدول الديمقراطية "حق الصمت" مكفول حتى للمتهم في قضية جنائية، وفي بلداننا أصبح هذا مطلبا للمواطن العادي. 
عزمي بشارة



DNA - 11/09/2017 إنشقاق نعيم قاسم عن حزب الله

Emad Hajjaj's Cartoon

اعصارنا !